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The financial consequences of the government-ordered
shutdowns of businesses across America to mitigate the COVID-19
health crisis are enormous. Estimates indicate that small businesses
have lost $255 to $431 billion per month and more than 44 million
workers have been laid off. When businesses have requested
reimbursement of their business interruption losses from their insurers
under business interruption policies, their insurers have denied the
claims. The insurance industry also has announced that business
interruption policies do not cover pandemic losses, so they intend to
fight COVID-19 claims “tooth and nail.” More than 450 lawsuits
throughout the country already have been brought against insurers,
including dozens of class actions. Legislators in several states have
proposed legislation that would require insurers to pay business
interruption claims regardless of whether the claims are covered by
the wording of the policies. In the absence of a government bailout,
the losers of this epic insurance battle—either insurers or their
insureds’ businesses—will likely face bankruptcy. Thus, the financial
consequences of this battle, and its implications for America’s
economy, cannot be overstated.
This is the first scholarly Essay to discuss the arguments for
and against business interruption policies covering COVID-19
business interruption losses. In doing so, it sets forth the strongest
arguments on each side of the fight regarding the meaning of the
applicable policy language in the context of the existing caselaw and
the purpose of business interruption insurance. It also addresses the
insurance industry’s claim that pandemic losses are not covered by
business interruption policies because such losses are simply
uninsurable. Finally, it discusses the competing public policies that
support each side.
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Harvard Law School; B.A., Columbia University. The author gratefully
acknowledges the legal research contributions of Jacob LaFreniere to this Essay.

2

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 27

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
A.
B.
III.
A.
B.
C.
IV.
A.

B.
C.
D.

V.
A.
B.

C.

D.
E.
VI.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 3
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION INSURANCE ....................... 6
POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE COVERAGES ........................... 7
POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE EXCLUSIONS........................... 9
RULES OF INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION . 10
BASIC RULES ................................................................... 10
CONTRA PROFERENTEM .................................................. 12
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS DOCTRINE ........................ 14
THE CASE FOR INSURERS .............................................. 16
COVID-19 BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES ARE NOT
CAUSED BY “PHYSICAL LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY” ...................................................................... 16
COVID-19 BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES ARE
EXCLUDED BY THE POLLUTION AND VIRUS EXCLUSIONS 17
PANDEMIC CLAIMS ARE UNINSURABLE CORRELATED
LOSSES ............................................................................ 17
PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES INSURERS SHOULD NOT BE
REQUIRED TO PAY COVID-19 BUSINESS INTERRUPTION
LOSSES ............................................................................ 19
THE CASE FOR POLICYHOLDERS................................. 20
COVID-19 BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES WERE
CAUSED BY “CONTAMINATION” ..................................... 20
COVID-19 BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES WERE
CAUSED BY “PHYSICAL LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY” ...................................................................... 20
THE POLLUTION AND VIRUS EXCLUSIONS DO NOT
APPLY.............................................................................. 26
1. Pollution Exclusion................................... 26
2. Virus Exclusion ........................................ 28
PANDEMIC LOSSES ARE NOT UNINSURABLE ................... 29
PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES COVID-19 BUSINESS
INTERRUPTION LOSSES SHOULD BE COVERED ................ 31
CONCLUSION .................................................................... 34

2020

I.

COVID-19 BUSINESS INTERRUPTION
INSURANCE LOSSES

3

INTRODUCTION

COVID-19 has brought havoc on the world. As of June 30,
2020, over 500,000 people had died worldwide, including more than
126,000 deaths in the United States.1 Not only is this new iteration of
the SARS virus deadly like its predecessor, but it is also highly
contagious due to its ability to be transmitted through the air and on
surfaces where it can survive for hours or days depending upon the
type of surface material.2 Indeed, the virus was detected on a
contaminated cruise ship seventeen days after the ship had been
evacuated.3
Governors across the country issued stay-at-home orders,
which prevented countless businesses from operating and caused
massive layoffs. By June 11, 2020, over 44 million people in the U.S.
had applied for unemployment benefits since the pandemic hit the
country with full force in March.4 The unemployment rate in the U.S.
reached Great Depression numbers that have been projected to average
at least 15 percent during the second and third quarters, and the gross
domestic product (GDP) has been projected to be down at least 12
percent in the second quarter.5 In addition to staggering losses by large
businesses, small businesses were estimated to be losing $255 to $431
1

Sarah Almukhtar, et al., Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case
Count, N.Y.
TIMES (last
updated
June
30,
2020,
8:00
AM),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html.
2
New Coronavirus Stable for Hours on Surfaces: SARS-CoV-2 Stability Similar
to Original SARS Virus, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L INST. OF
HEALTH (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/newcoronavirus-stable-hours-surfaces.
3
See Leah F. Moriarty, et al., Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
(MMWR), CDC (Mar.
27,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6912e3.htm?s_cid=mm6912e3_w
(“SARS-CoV-2 RNA was identified on a variety of surfaces in cabins of both
symptomatic and asymptomatic infected passengers up to 17 days after cabins were
vacated on the Diamond Princess . . . .”).
4
Tiffany Hsu, Sobering Jobs Outlook: ‘We’re Expecting a Long Haul’, N.Y.
TIMES (June
11,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/11/business/economy/unemployment-claimscoronavirus.html.
5
Phill Swagel, CBO’s Current Projects of Output, Employment, and Interest
Rates and a Preliminary Look at Federal Deficits for 2020 and 2021, CBO (Apr.
24, 2020), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56335.
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billion per month due to the government-ordered shutdowns.6 The
United States Department of Labor estimates that 40 percent of
businesses never reopen after experiencing a disaster.7 Of those that
reopen, at least 25 percent fail within two years.8
To avoid such a fate, most large businesses and approximately
40 percent of small businesses purchase business interruption
insurance, which is intended to cover lost revenues and other monetary
damage caused by business interruptions.9 Many businesses have been
paying premiums on such policies for years.10 Naturally, these
businesses turned to their insurers for help when faced with the
devastating losses caused by COVID-19. In response, the insurance
industry announced that COVID-19 business interruption losses are
not covered by their policies and that pandemic losses are simply
uninsurable.11 The insurance industry also claimed that property
insurers only collect approximately $6 billion per month in premiums
which would bankrupt the industry if they were required to cover the
6
Press Release, Am. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n, APCIA Releases New Business
Interruption
Analysis (Apr.
6,
2020) (available
at http://www.pciaa.net/pciwebsite/cms/content/viewpage?sitePageId=60052).
7
John Grossmann, A Business Ponders Whether its Location is Perfect, or a
Disaster, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec.
7,
2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/business/smallbusiness/a-business-tries-todecide-whether-its-location-is-perfect-or-a-disaster.html.
8
Id.
9
Suzanne Barlyn, U.S. Insurers Want Taxpayers to Back Pandemic Coverage
for Businesses, REUTERS (April 29, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/ushealth-coronavirus-insurance-pandemic/u-s-insurers-want-taxpayers-to-backpandemic-coverage-for-businesses-idUSKCN22B1J8.
10
See, e.g., Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Business Owners Bleeding Money During the
Coronavirus Shutdown May Expect Insurance to Cover Their Losses. But Often
They’re
in
for
a
Shock, CHI.
TRIB. (April
16,
2020),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-coronavirus-business-interruptioninsurance-lawsuits-20200416-b5kl3xaweja7refbqfr4cpkp3u-story.html (reporting
that one policyholder asked, “How could they take our fees for 10 years and then not
pay out?” after being told of the insurer’s position).
11
See Am. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n, supra note 6 (“Many commercial insurance
policies, including those that have business interruption coverage, do not provide
coverage for communicable diseases or viruses such as COVID-19. Pandemic
outbreaks are uninsured because they are uninsurable.”); see also Julia Jacobs, Arts
Groups Fight Their Insurers Over Coverage on Virus Losses, N.Y. TIMES (May 5,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/arts/insurance-claims-coronavirusarts.html.
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losses.12 Consequently, according to the CEO of one of the world’s
largest insurers, “[t]he industry will fight [paying COVID-19 business
interruption claims] tooth and nail.”13
By June 22, 2020, the insurance industry’s blanket denial of
coverage for COVID-19 business interruption losses had spawned
over 450 lawsuits, including dozens of class actions, across the
country.14 It also prompted legislators in at least eight states to propose
legislation that would require insurers to pay the claims regardless of
the policy language at issue.15
In the absence of a government bailout for the losers of this
epic battle, court determinations regarding which parties will suffer
the financial losses caused by COVID-19 business interruptions will
determine the fate of the insurance industry and many large and small
businesses. Thus, the financial stakes for insurers, small and large
businesses, and America’s economic future could not be higher.
This Essay sets forth the arguments for and against business
interruption policies covering COVID-19 business interruption losses.
It is the first Essay to do so. It intends to make the strongest arguments
each side has regarding the meaning of the applicable policy language
See Am. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n, supra note 6.
Jacobs, supra note 11; see also Evan G. Greenberg, What Won’t Cure
Corona:
Lawsuits, WALL
ST.
J. (April
21,
2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-wont-cure-corona-lawsuits-11587504920
(“Some businesses and policy makers think business-interruption coverage should
pay out for the pandemic’s damage, even though those risks aren’t covered in these
policies, nor were premiums collected for the exposure . . . . If implemented, it would
bankrupt the insurance industry to prop up other parts of the economy.”).
14
See, e.g., Covid Coverage Litigation Tracker, University of Pennsylvania
Carey Law School (as of June 22, 2020), https://cclt.law.upenn.edu/;
Jim Sams, Number of Federal COVID-19 Business Interruption Lawsuits at 101 and
Rising, CLAIMS
J. (May
21,
2020),
https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2020/05/21/297180.htm; ElejaldeRuiz, supra note 10; Leslie Scism, Politicians Push Insurers to Resolve Mounting
Disputes Over Covid-19 Losses, WALL ST. J. (April 13, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/politicians-push-insurers-to-cover-business-losses11586794059; Jacobs, supra note 11.
15
See, e.g., Elejalde-Ruiz, supra note 10; Huw Jones & Carolyn Cohn, Forced
Pandemic Payouts Risk Financial Instability: Insurance Regulators, REUTERS (May
7,
2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-insuranceregulato/forced-pandemic-payouts-risk-financial-instability-insurance-regulatorsidUSKBN22J225.
12
13
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when read in the context of existing caselaw with the purpose of
business interruption insurance in mind. Although the actual wording
of the policies is important, which courts decide the cases will also be
critical to the outcomes. This is because insurance disputes are
governed by state law and the law can vary considerably from state to
state.16 In analyzing these issues, this Essay also addresses the
insurance industry’s claim that pandemics are uninsurable, and it
weighs the competing public policies that support each side.
II.

BUSINESS INTERRUPTION INSURANCE

Business interruption insurance protects a business’ income
stream when its operations are shut down by a covered peril. The
purpose of business interruption insurance is to return the policyholder
to the position it would have occupied if the covered peril had not
occurred.17
Typically, business interruption insurance is purchased as part
of an “all risk” property insurance policy. All risk property policies
See, e.g., Peter J. Kalis et al., POLICYHOLDER’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF
INSURANCE COVERAGE §26.03[B] (1st ed. 1997 & Supp. 2020) (“Insurance
contracts are interpreted according to state law. Not surprisingly, the manner in
which the courts of the various states address similar interpretive issues can vary
widely from one state to the next.”); Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex
Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 553–54 (1996) (“Conflicts scholars don’t fight
bitterly about the differences among approaches [to determining choice law] because
we disagree about their aesthetic qualities. We fight because the differences matter
in terms of outcomes.”).
17
Cont’l Ins. Co. v. DNE Corp., 834 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Nw.
States Portland Cement Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 360 F.2d 531 (8th Cir.
1966)) (“The purpose of business interruption insurance is to protect the insured
against losses that occur when its operations are unexpectedly interrupted, and to
place it in the position it would have occupied if the interruption had not
occurred.”). See also Gregory D. Miller & Joseph D. Jean, Effect of Post-Loss
Economic Factors in Measuring Business Interruption Losses: An Insured’s and
Insurer’s Perspectives, in NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE: CURRENT CRITICAL
ISSUES IN INSURANCE LAW 25, 25 (2010) (“Business interruption insurance, at its
core, is intended to place the insured in the position it would have been in had it not
suffered a loss.”); Jon C. Rice, Business Interruption Coverage in the Wake of
Katrina: Measuring the Insured’s Loss in a Volatile Economy, 41 TORT TRIAL &
INS. PRAC. L.J. 857, 857 (2006) (“The purpose of business interruption coverage is
to place the insured in the position it would have occupied had no interruption
occurred.”).
16
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are the broadest form of property insurance available because they
cover all losses the policyholder suffers unless the peril causing the
loss is specifically excluded.18 Unlike the policy language used in
some other lines of insurance—often identical from insurer to insurer
because the insurers all use the same policy form drafted by the
Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO)—the policy language in
business interruption insurance policies can vary from insurer to
insurer.19 Despite some variations from insurer to insurer, the
language in business interruption policies, like other lines of
insurance, is drafted by insurers and then sold on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis.20
A.

POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE COVERAGES

Under most business interruption policies, there are four policy
provisions that potentially provide coverage for COVID-19 business
interruption losses. Because the language used by insurers can vary,
however, the four examples set forth below are just that—examples.

18

See, e.g., Jeff Katofsky, Subsiding Away: Can California Homeowners
Recover from Their Insurer for Subsidence Damages to Their Homes?, 20 PAC. L.
J. 783, 785 (1989) (“In an ‘all-risk’ policy, all losses except those specifically
excluded are covered. This is the broadest form of coverage and has been so
interpreted by the courts.”) (emphasis in original).
19
See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993)
(“Defendant Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO), [is] an association of
approximately 1,400 domestic property and casualty insurers. . . . [ISO] is the almost
exclusive source of support services in this country for [Commercial General
Liability (CGL)] insurance. ISO develops standard policy forms and files or lodges
them with each State’s insurance regulators; most CGL insurance written in the
United States is written on these forms.”) (internal citations omitted); U.S. Fire Ins.
Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So.2d 871, 879 n.6 (Fla. 2007) (“[ISO] is an industry
organization that promulgates various standard insurance policies that are utilized
by insurers throughout the country. . . .”).
20
See, e.g., James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special
Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 996 (1992)
(“[T]here is little, if any, freedom to negotiate the standardized language of the
insurance contract that determines the scope of coverage.”); Susan
Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 (2007)
(“[I]n some lines of insurance, all insurance companies provide identical coverage
on the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”).
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The first potential source of coverage arises under the basic
insuring agreement, which states, “We will pay for the actual loss of
Business Income you sustain due to the necessary suspension of ‘your
operations’ . . . caused by direct physical loss of or damage to covered
property . . . . .”21 Under this language, business interruption coverage
is triggered if the policyholder’s business is interrupted because of
physical loss or damage to some or all of the policyholder’s property
that the policyholder needs to generate income for the business. If a
tornado rips the roof off a policyholder’s restaurant, for example, then
the restaurant will cease operations until repairs can be completed.
This type of event, where it is obvious the policyholder’s property has
been tangibly damaged, is an example of where business interruption
coverage is commonly triggered. Notably, however, the term
“damage” and the phrase “direct physical loss of or damage” are not
defined in the policy, so there is no basis in the policy language itself
to conclude that tangible, physical damage is required in order to
trigger coverage.
The second potential source of coverage is the Civil Authority
provision, which states, “When a Covered Cause of Loss causes
damage to property other than property at the [policyholder’s
business], we will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you
sustain . . . caused by action of civil authority that prohibits access to
the described premises . . . .”22 Under this language, if a civil authority
prevents a policyholder from doing business due to “damage” to
someone else’s property, then coverage is triggered. Again, “damage”
is undefined, but a classic example of this scenario is a downed
powerline on the street in front of a business that prompts local
officials to close the business until the powerline is repaired.
The third potential source of coverage is the Contingent
Properties provision, which provides, “We will pay for the actual loss
of Business Income you sustain due to physical loss or damage at the
premises of a ‘dependent property’ or a ‘secondary dependent
property’ caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss . . .
.”23 Under this coverage, a policyholder’s business interruption losses
are covered if they are caused by a supplier or a customer’s inability
21

Complaint Exhibit A at 68, JDS 1455, Inc. v. Society Insurance, No. 1:20-cv02546 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) [hereinafter Business Owners Policy].
22
Id. at 85.
23
Id. at 72.
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to do business with the policyholder due to physical loss or damage at
the supplier’s or customer’s own properties. Although “physical loss
or damage” is again undefined, an example of this scenario is a corn
processing plant that is unable to operate its business because its corn
supplier’s business is hit by a tornado. Thus, the supplier is unable to
deliver corn needed for the policyholder’s corn processing operations.
The fourth potential source of coverage is the Contamination
provision, which states, “If your ‘operations’ are suspended due to
‘contamination,’ [then] we will . . . pay for the actual loss of Business
Income . . . you sustain caused by (a) ‘Contamination’ that results in
an action by a public health or other governmental authority that
prohibits access to the [policyholder’s business] . . . .”24
Contamination is defined as “a . . . dangerous condition in your . . .
premises.”25 Unlike the other three business interruption coverage
provisions that are predicated upon “physical loss or damage” to some
property—either the policyholder’s or a third party’s—contamination
coverage is triggered by a “dangerous condition” at the policyholder’s
premises.
B.

POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE EXCLUSIONS

There are also two exclusions in some business interruption
policies that may be applicable to COVID-19 claims. The first is the
“virus” exclusion, which ISO introduced in 2006 following the SARS
outbreak. The key portion of the exclusion states, “We will not pay for
loss or damage resulting from any virus, bacterium or other
microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical distress,
illness or disease.”26 In seeking regulatory approval for the exclusion,
the insurance industry stated that “[a]lthough building and personal
property arguably could become contaminated (often temporarily) by
such viruses and bacteria, . . . property policies have not been a source
of recovery for losses involving contamination by disease-causing
24

Id. at 71.
Id. at 72.
26
INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, ISO FORM CP 01 40 07 06 - EXCLUSION OF
LOSS DUE TO VIRUS OR BACTERIA 8 (ISO Circular July 6, 2006) [hereinafter ISO
Circular],
https://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/files/2020/03/ISOCircular-LI-CF-2006-175-Virus.pdf.
25
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agents . . . .”27 Although it specifically referenced the SARS virus
when seeking approval of the virus exclusion, the insurance industry
stated that the exclusion was not limited to just that virus because “the
universe of disease-causing organisms is always in evolution.”28
The second potentially applicable exclusion is the “pollution”
exclusion. This exclusion commonly states, “We will not pay for loss
or damage caused by or resulting from the discharge, dispersal,
seepage, migration, release or escape of ‘pollutants’ . . . .”29 Pollutants
is defined as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled,
reconditioned or reclaimed.”30
III.

RULES OF INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION
A.

BASIC RULES

Insurance policies arguably are not really contracts because
they are non-negotiable, and the purchaser generally does not get a
chance to review the policy before purchasing it. They nonetheless are
generally treated by courts as contracts when disputes arise regarding
the meaning of policy language.31 The interpretation of policy
language is a question of law for courts to determine.32 The policy
language that grants coverage is construed broadly, while provisions
27

Id. at 10.
Id. at 5.
29
Business Owners Policy, supra note 21, at 82.
30
Id. at 31.
31
See, e.g., Sonson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 100 A.3d 1, 2, 5 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2014) (“Standardized contracts of insurance continue to be prime examples of
contracts of adhesion . . . . The interpretation of a contract presents a question of law
subject to de novo review.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Pryor v. Colony Ins., 414 S.W.3d 424, 430 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013) (“[M]ost insurance
policies are contracts of adhesion . . . . To ascertain the construction of an insurance
contract, one begins with the text of the policy itself.”).
32
See, e.g., STEVEN PITT, ET AL., 2 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 21:3 (3d ed. 2016)
(“As a general rule, the construction and effect of a written contract of insurance is
a matter of law, to be determined by the court and not by the jury.”) (citation
omitted); ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 133 (5th ed. 2012) (“[T]he interpretation of [an insurance] contract
is a question of law and is therefore reserved to the court.”).
28
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that exclude or limit coverage are construed narrowly.33 Exclusionary
language should not be interpreted in a way that allows it to swallow
the basic coverage provided by the policy.34 Courts also attempt to
interpret the policy as a whole, reconciling all of its provisions.35
In construing policy language,36 courts do so with the purpose
of the insurance in mind—the way a layman would understand the
policy language.37 This means that courts often refer to standard
33

See, e.g., Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 252 P.3d 668, 672 (Nev.
2011) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. v. Reno’s Exec. Air, Inc., 682 P.2d 1380, 1383
(Nev. 1984)) (“While clauses providing coverage are interpreted broadly so as to
afford the greatest possible coverage to the insured, clauses excluding coverage are
interpreted narrowly against the insurer.”).
34
See, e.g., Harris v. Gulf Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1226 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(rejecting insurer’s interpretation of an exclusion in policy because it “would render
the coverage provided by the policy illusory.”); Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins.
Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 398 (D. Del. 2002) (rejecting insurer’s interpretation of
an exclusion where, if applied, “there would be little or nothing left to that
coverage,” because “[n]o insured would expect such limited coverage from a policy
. . . .”); Titan Idem. Co. v. Newton, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1348 (N.D. Ala. 1999)
(finding coverage even though “[t]he limitations of [the] policy completely swallow
up the insuring provisions.”); Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375, 1380 (Md.
1997) (“If the exclusion totally swallows the insuring provision, the provisions are
completely contradictory. That is the grossest form of ambiguity . . . .”).
35
See, e.g., Rothenberg v. Lincoln Farm Camp, Inc., 755 F.2d 1017, 1019 (2d
Cir. 1985) (“[A]n interpretation that gives a reasonable and effective meaning to all
the terms of a contract is generally preferred to one that leaves a part unreasonable
or of no effect.”); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 234 Cal. App. 3d
1154, 1169 (1991) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Crane, 217 Cal. App.
3d 1127, 1132 (1990)) (“In short, an insurance contract is to be construed in a
manner which gives meaning to all its provisions in a natural, reasonable, and
practical manner, having reference to the risk and subject matter and to the purposes
of the entire contract.” (citation omitted).
36
The terms “interpretation” and “construction” are used interchangeably when
it comes to interpreting insurance policies. Technically, interpretation involves
attempting to discern the parties’ mutual intent regarding the language, while
construction involves discerning the legally binding effect of the language. Because
there is no mutual intent to discern when it comes to understanding an insurance
policy, insurance policies technically are construed by courts, not interpreted. See,
e.g., Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1109–10 (2006). Nonetheless, in this Essay,
the terms are used interchangeably because courts and commentators often use the
term interpretation when discussing the construction of policy language.
37
See, e.g., Fageol Truck & Coach Co. v. Pac. Indem. Co., 117 P.2d 669, 671
(Cal. 1941) (quoting Cutting v. Atlas Mut. Ins. Co., 85 N.E. 174, 175 (Mass.
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dictionaries when construing the policy language, as opposed to using
technical meanings or the insurance industry’s own understanding of
the terms.38
As discussed in the next part, in addition to these basic rules of
contract interpretation, courts have developed some special rules
regarding the interpretation of policies. These special rules have been
created due to the imbalance of power and knowledge that favors
insurers during the creation and sale of insurance policies.
Additionally, these rules address the public policies implicated by
insurance’s role as a social safety net—it is intended to compensate
injured parties and protect policyholders from suffering devastating
losses they cannot financially bear individually.
B.

CONTRA PROFERENTEM

The doctrine of contra proferentem provides that any
ambiguities in contract language should be construed against the
drafter.39 Because insurers draft the policies, the doctrine dictates that
ambiguities should be construed against insurers.40 In many states, the
1908) (the policy “must be given ‘such a construction . . . as, if fairly warranted, will
best carry out the object for which the contract was entered into, namely, that of
securing indemnity to the insured for the losses to which the insurance
relates.’”) (omission in original); Glidden v. Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n, 312 N.E.2d
247, 250 (Ill. 1974) (a policy should be interpreted “in the particular factual setting
in which the contract was issued.”); Century Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 482 P.2d 193, 194 (Cal. 1971) (Policy “language is to be construed in accord
with the reasonable understanding of a layman . . . .”); Pac. Indem. Co. v. Interstate
Fire & Cas. Co., 488 A.2d 486, 488 (Md. 1985) (“In [interpreting policy language],
we accord words their ordinary and accepted meanings. The test is what meaning a
reasonably prudent layperson would attach to the term.”); Kissil v. Beneficial Nat’l
Life Ins. Co., 319 A.2d 67, 70 (N.J. 1974) (“The policy should be read as the ordinary
policyholder would understand it.”).
38
See, e.g., Scott v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App. 4th 24, 29 (1996) (“In seeking
to ascertain the ordinary sense of words, courts in insurance cases regularly turn to
general dictionaries.”); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 32, at 138 (“In affording
terms their ordinary meaning, courts frequently consult standard English language
dictionaries.”).
39
See, e.g., Boardman, supra note 36, at 1121 n.64 (quoting 17A
C.J.S. Contracts § 337 (2003)) (“The language of a contract will be construed most
strictly or strongly against the party responsible for its use . . . .” ).
40
See, e.g., Crane v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 485 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Cal.
1971) (“Any ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy is to be resolved against
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ambiguity test is whether the policy language can be reasonably
interpreted in different ways.41 If the policyholder and insurer both
have reasonable interpretations, then the policy language should be
construed in favor of coverage because it is deemed ambiguous.42
And, as is often the case when it comes to standardized policy
language that is interpreted by numerous courts across the country, if
the same language has been interpreted in different ways by different
courts, then the inconsistencies may be treated as indicia that the
policy language is ambiguous.43

the insurer.”); Crawford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 783 P.2d 900, 904 (Kan.
1989) (quoting Fowler v. United Equitable Ins. Co., 438 P.2d 46, 48 (Kan.
1968) (“Since an insurer prepares its own contracts, it has a duty to make the
meaning clear, and if it fails to do so, the insurer, and not the insured, must
suffer.”); Ethan J. Leib & Steve Thel, Contra Proferentem and the Role of the Jury
in Contract Interpretation, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 773, 774 n.4 (2015) (quoting Phillips
v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 312 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he contra
proferentem rule . . . is followed in all fifty states and the District of Columbia, and
with good reason. Insurance policies are almost always drafted by specialists
employed by the insurer. In light of the drafters’ expertise and experience, the insurer
should be expected to set forth any limitations on its liability clearly enough for a
common layperson to understand; if it fails to do this, it should not be allowed to
take advantage of the very ambiguities that it could have prevented with greater
diligence.”) (alterations in original).
41
See, e.g., New Castle Cty. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 243 F.3d
744, 750 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting New Castle Cty. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, 174 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The settled test for ambiguity is
whether the provisions in controversy are reasonably or fairly susceptible of
different interpretations or may have two or more different meanings.”); Bonner v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 841 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (“The court
must adopt the construction of an exclusionary clause urged by the insured as long
as that construction is not unreasonable, even if the construction urged by the insurer
appears to be more reasonable or a more accurate reflection of the parties’ intent.”).
42
Id.
43
See, e.g., Crawford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 783 P.2d 900, 908 (Kan.
1989) (“[T]he reported cases are in conflict, the trial judge and the Court of Appeals
reached different conclusions and the justices of this court [disagree] . . . . Under
such circumstances, the clause is, by definition, ambiguous and must be interpreted
in favor of the insured.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 311
S.W.2d 41, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (“Since we assume that all courts adopt a
reasonable construction, the conflict is of itself indicative that the word as so used is
susceptible of at least two reasonable interpretations, one of which extends the
coverage to the situation at hand.”); Cohen v. Erie Indem. Co., 432 A.2d 596, 599
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REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS DOCTRINE

Another interpretive rule, unique to insurance policies, is the
“reasonable expectations doctrine.”44 Although courts use different
versions of the reasonable expectations doctrine, one version provides
that the policyholder should receive the coverage that it reasonably
thought it had purchased, even if the claim is not covered under the
express terms of the policy language.45
Courts can justify the creation and use of the reasonable
expectations doctrine on several grounds. For one, policyholders need
protection from policy language that unfairly favors insurers because
policyholders have no input into the drafting of the policy language
and typically do not get to see the policy language before purchasing
a policy.46 Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts specifically
recognizes that courts can refuse to enforce terms contained in
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (“The mere fact that [courts do not agree on the meaning of
the language] . . . creates the inescapable conclusion that the provision in issue is
susceptible to more than one interpretation.”).
44
See, e.g., BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON
INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES §1.04[b], at 34–48 (19th ed. 2019) (identifying
courts in forty-two states that have expressed support for, or applied a form of, the
reasonable expectations doctrine).
45
See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990)
(insurance policies should be interpreted broadly to “pro[tect] the objectively
reasonable expectations of the insured.”); Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons,
Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488, 495–96 (W. Va. 1987) (the reasonable expectations doctrine
dictates that a policy be construed in a manner that a reasonable person standing in
the shoes of the insured would expect the language to mean, even though painstaking
examination of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations); ROBERT E. KEETON, ALAN I. WIDISS & JAMES M. FISCHER,
INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND
COMMERCIAL PRACTICES §§ 6.3(a)(5), at 538 n. 98 (2d ed. 1988) (“In general, courts
will protect the reasonable expectations of applicants, insureds, and intended
beneficiaries regarding the coverage afforded by insurance contracts even though a
careful examination of the policy provisions indicates that such expectations are
contrary to the expressed intention of the insurer.”).
46
See, e.g., Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce
Insurance Policyholders’ Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance
Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 363 (1998); Boardman, supra note 36, at 1120;
Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions,
83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (1970); Randall, supra note 20, at 107.
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standardized insurance policies that a policyholder would reject if it
could.47 Thus, the policy language is not always controlling because
the policyholder’s expectations regarding the coverage it is purchasing
is not based upon the policy language itself and it has no ability to
reject the policy language.
Additionally, public policy supports the doctrine. Because
policyholders are required to buy some lines of insurance (e.g., auto
insurance),48 and they need other types of insurance in order to avoid
financial ruin when catastrophic events occur (e.g., health insurance
and business interruption insurance), insurance serves the necessary
function of a social safety net in order to compensate injured parties
for their losses.49 Insurance policies should be interpreted expansively
to advance these public policies.
Finally, state statutes enable insurance regulators to reject
policy language that is unreasonable, unfair, ambiguous, or contrary
to public policy.50 Courts similarly should do so when needed.

47
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) cmt c. (AM. LAW
INST. 1981) (recognizing that some terms in standardized contracts should not be
enforced if the other party would have rejected the term if it could and specifically
listing insurance policies as a type of standard contract that needs to be regulated
due to the risk of insurers overreaching).
48
See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 32, at 924–25; Anderson &
Fournier, supra note 46, at 368; Randall, supra note 20, at 125.
49
See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 826 F. Supp. 155, 163–
64 (E.D. Va. 1993) (discussing public policy of compensating innocent victims
outweighs public policy of not permitting coverage for intentional actions); St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Asbury, 720 P.2d 540, 542 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (noting
Arizona public policy favors compensating injured persons); Kenneth S.
Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 668 (2013)
(discussing insurance’s role as a public utility); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance
Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489,
1497 (2010) (discussing the socially important role that insurance plays).
50
See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW
AND REGULATION 143, 146 (6th ed. 2015); Randall, supra note 20, at 146.
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COVID-19 BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES ARE NOT
CAUSED BY “PHYSICAL LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY”

According to insurers, COVID-19 business interruption losses
are not covered because their policies unambiguously require that the
losses be caused by “physical loss of or damage to property” in order
to be covered. This means theft or tangible, physical damage to
property must cause the business interruption. COVID-19 business
interruption losses are not caused by theft or tangible, physical damage
to property. To the contrary, the losses have been caused by
government orders shutting businesses down in order to slow the
spread of the virus and reduce the number of people simultaneously
getting sick and dying. No property has been physically lost or
damaged such that business operations were suspended as a result.
Consequently, business interruption insurance, which covers business
interruption losses due to theft or tangible, physical property damage,
does not cover COVID-19 business interruption claims.
To support this argument, insurers can cite numerous cases in
which courts have held that “physical loss of or damage” requires
either theft or tangible injury to property.51 According to the reasoning
of these cases, losses that result from business interruptions caused by
the fear of illness or death are not the result of tangible, physical loss
or damage. Consequently, COVID-19 business interruption losses are
not covered.

51

See, e.g., Dickie Brennan & Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 636 F.3d 683 (5th Cir.
2011) (finding that business interruption losses incurred by operators of New
Orleans restaurants due to a mandatory evacuation of the city prior to the arrival of
Hurricane Gustav were not caused by direct physical loss of or damage to
property); Source Food Tech., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 465 F.3d 834 (8th Cir.
2006) (deciding that business interruption losses resulting from embargo due to
“mad cow disease” that prevented insured from shipping uncontaminated beef were
not caused by physical loss); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 439 F.3d
128, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) (determining the airline could not show that its lost earnings
resulted from physical damage to its property or from physical damage to an adjacent
property when government shut down airport following 9/11 terrorist attack).
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COVID-19 BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES ARE
EXCLUDED BY THE POLLUTION AND VIRUS EXCLUSIONS

Even if COVID-19 business interruption losses were somehow
considered the result of physical loss or damage to property, insurers
argue such claims still would not be covered because the pollution and
virus exclusions bar such claims. The pollution exclusion states a “loss
. . . caused by or resulting from the discharge, dispersal, seepage,
migration, release or escape of ‘pollutants’” is not covered.52
“Pollutants” are defined as “any solid, liquid, gaseous . . . irritant or
contaminant . . . .”53 The COVID-19 virus, and its transmission,
qualifies as a solid, liquid or gaseous irritant or contaminant. Thus,
losses caused by the virus are excluded from coverage by the pollution
exclusion.
Even more applicable, however, is the virus exclusion. The
virus exclusion was specifically created to exclude coverage for losses
caused by viruses. The COVID-19 virus is a variation of the virus that
causes SARS, which is one of the viruses specifically listed in the ISO
Circular that explained what was intended to be covered by the
exclusion.54 Thus, for policies that contain a virus exclusion, there
should be no question that the virus exclusion applies to COVID-19
business interruption losses.
C.

PANDEMIC CLAIMS ARE UNINSURABLE CORRELATED
LOSSES

Insurers also argue that the reason pandemic claims, such as
COVID-19 business interruption losses, are not covered by their
policies is because the losses associated with pandemics are
uninsurable correlated risks.55 Correlated risks are losses caused by
perils that result in numerous losses occurring in the same geographic
area at approximately the same time.56 Because many types of natural
52

See Business Owners Policy, supra note 21, at 82.
See id. at 31.
54
See ISO Circular, supra note 26.
55
See Am. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n, supra note 6 (“Pandemic outbreaks are
uninsured because they are uninsurable.”).
56
See Véronique Bruggeman et al., Insurance Against Catastrophe:
Government Stimulation of Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE
53
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catastrophes, such as floods and earthquakes, are considered
correlated risks, private insurers generally refuse to insure them.57
Private insurers avoid insuring correlated risks because of insurers’
alleged inability to accurately predict when, where, and how many
losses associated with the peril will occur.58 This uncertainty makes it
difficult to establish actuarially sound premiums and spread the risk
across a large enough pool of insureds with diverse risk profiles.59
Pandemics are an extreme type of correlated risk because they
happen on a world-wide basis. As such, insurers purportedly did not
intend to cover them under business interruption policies and did not
charge a premium for them.60

ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185, 187 (2012); J. David Cummins, Should the Government
Provide Insurance for Catastrophes?, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV., 337, 342–
43 (July 2006); Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and
Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 10–11 (2006).
57
See,
e.g., Correlated
Risks, WORLD
FINANCE (June
30,
2010), http://www.worldfinance.com/
home/risk-encyclopaedia/correlated-risks
[https://perma.cc/CQ3D-865A].
58
Id.
59
See Bruggeman et al., supra note 56, at 187.
60
See Am. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n, supra note 6; Greenberg, supra note
13. Whether a portion of the premium charged by insurers for the all risk policies
that cover business interruption losses was intended to cover pandemic risks is, of
course, a factual issue, but the premium charged for an all risk policy covers all risks,
except risks that are expressly excluded. If a risk, such as pandemics, is not excluded,
then it is covered regardless of whether insurers specifically considered the risk
when creating the premium rate. Moreover, premium rates are not based upon an
aggregation of premium amounts charged for each of the countless risks covered by
all risk policies. Rather, they are based upon broad factors, such as the value of the
property insured, the type of materials used in the construction of the property (e.g.,
brick versus lumber), the nature of the activities conducted in the property (e.g.,
welding versus office administration), the presence of risk reduction measures in or
near the property (e.g., fire sprinklers and fire hydrants), and the location of the
property (e.g., a high crime area versus a low crime area). See, e.g., How to Get an
Affordable
Commercial
Property
Insurance
Policy, NATIONWIDE, https://www.nationwide.com/lc/resources/smallbusiness/articles/property-insurance-rates; How to Calculate Commercial Property
Insurance
Rates, EK
INSURANCE, https://ekinsurance.com/commercialproperty/how-to-calculate-commercial-property-insurance-rates.html.
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PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES INSURERS SHOULD NOT BE
REQUIRED TO PAY COVID-19 BUSINESS INTERRUPTION
LOSSES

According to the insurance industry, it would be bad public
policy to require insurers to pay COVID-19 business interruption
losses.61 The insurance industry makes two arguments to support its
position.
One, because the policies unambiguously do not cover
pandemic business interruption losses, courts would need to rewrite
the policies or ignore the clear language in them in order to find
coverage. This would violate the public policy that favors enforcing
contracts as written. Public policy favors enforcing contracts due to
freedom of choice and to ensure that parties’ rights and obligations are
predictable.62 Failing to enforce the policies as written would vitiate
this public policy.
Two, requiring insurers to cover all COVID-19 business
interruption losses would bankrupt the insurance industry.63 Propertycasualty insurers collect approximately $6 billion a month in
premiums. The American Property Casualty Insurance Association
estimates that the monthly COVID-19 business interruption losses just
for businesses with 100 or fewer employees is $255 to $431 billion
per month, for which no premiums allegedly have been charged or
collected.64 The net worth of property-casualty insurers is only
approximately $800 billion.65 Consequently, the insurance industry
See Am. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n, supra note 6; Greenberg, supra note 13.
See, e.g., MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ & DENISE RIEBE, CONTRACTS: A
CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK 5 (2009) (“[P]redictability promotes our free
market economy by providing certainty for those involved in exchanging goods and
services. If a merchant knows the legal consequences of her negotiating efforts or
of the language she selects for her contracts, she can act accordingly. This
predictability encourages people to enter into contracts, secure in the knowledge that
those contracts will be enforced.”); Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under
Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U.L. REV. 749, 751 (2000) (“Longterm contracts raise a straightforward, but seemingly intractable problem: in the long
term events are so hard to predict, that parties will not be able to allocate future
obligations and payments in a way that maximizes the value of their contract.”).
63
See Greenberg, supra note 13.
64
See Am. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n, supra note 6; Greenberg, supra note 13.
65
See Am. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n, supra note 6.
61
62
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simply cannot afford to cover the losses. Although the insurance
industry should not be expected to provide financial security to people
and businesses in the event of a pandemic, it is an important industry
that should be preserved to help pay for less significant losses caused
by other perils. Thus, it would be bad public policy to allow the
insurance industry to become bankrupt, especially by forcing insurers
to pay claims they contend are not covered by their policies.
V.

THE CASE FOR POLICYHOLDERS
A.

COVID-19 BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES WERE
CAUSED BY “CONTAMINATION”

For policyholders with business interruption coverage for
losses caused by “contamination,” COVID-19 business interruption
losses should be covered. Some policies expressly cover business
interruption losses caused by “contamination” that “results in an
action by a . . . governmental authority that prohibits access to the
described premises . . . .”66 “Contamination” is defined as a
“dangerous condition in your . . . premises.”67 There should be little
dispute that the government-ordered shutdowns of the policyholders’
businesses were the result of dangerous conditions at the
policyholders’ places of business—potentially infected property,
employees and customers—that created a risk of illness and death if
business operations continued.
B.

COVID-19 BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES WERE
CAUSED BY “PHYSICAL LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY”

Under the rules of policy interpretation, COVID-19 business
interruption losses are covered because they were caused by
government orders shutting down policyholders’ businesses due to
“physical loss of or damage” to the policyholders’ property. The
phrase “physical loss of or damage” is undefined, so it should be
interpreted expansively as a layperson would understand the phrase.68
66

See Business Owners Policy, supra note 21, at 82.
Id. at 31.
68
See cases cited supra note 37.
67
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It should also be interpreted in accordance with the reasonable
expectations of policyholders.69 Finally, any ambiguities in the
meaning of the phrase should be construed against insurers and in
favor of policyholders.70
Applying these rules of policy interpretation to the policy
language at issue, government orders shutting down businesses
because of actual or threatened COVID-19 contamination either in the
air or on surfaces of the policyholders’ properties constitutes “physical
loss of or damage to property.” First, if there is actual contamination
of a policyholder’s business premises with COVID-19, then there
should be little dispute that the property is unusable in that condition
because there is a substantial risk of people getting sick and dying.
Some of the government shutdown orders were expressly issued
because COVID-19 contamination was “causing property loss and
damage.”71
Second, even if the properties do not have tangible, physical
damage, policyholders have still suffered physical loss or damage if
they cannot use their properties because it would be unsafe to do so.
Numerous courts have reached this conclusion in a variety of contexts.
For example, the Third Circuit has held the presence of e-coli
bacteria in a well that supplied water to an insured house could
constitute physical loss or damage to the house if it made the house
useless or uninhabitable even though the well itself was not covered
by the policy.72 Similarly, other courts have held the presence of

69

See cases cited supra note 45.
See sources cited supra notes 39–40.
71
See, e.g., Bill de Blasio, New York City Mayor, Emergency Exec. Order No.
101, 1 (Mar. 17, 2020) (“WHEREAS, this order is given because of the propensity
of the virus to spread person-to-person and also because the virus is causing property
loss
and
damage .
.
.
.”) (emphasis in
original),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/executive-orders/2020/eeo101.pdf.
72
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hardinger, 131 F. App'x 823, 826–27 (3d Cir.
2005).
70
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wildfire smoke,73 ammonia,74 or carbon dioxide75 in insured properties
rendered the properties unsafe and thus, business interruption
coverage was triggered even though no tangible, physical injury to the
properties had occurred.
The Colorado Supreme Court held gas beneath a church that
rendered the property unsafe for occupancy constituted a “physical
loss” of the church even though the church had not suffered a tangible,
physical injury.76 Another court held the loss in value of a house that
became unsafe due to a nearby landslide was also covered even though
the house itself was not physically damaged by the landslide.77 Other
courts have held a foul odor present in a property can constitute
physical loss or damage—if the property needs to be remediated to
remove the odor or becomes uninhabitable due to the odor—even
though the insured property itself did not suffer a tangible, physical
injury.78
73

See Oregon Shakespeare Festival Ass'n v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 1:15-cv01932-CL, 2016 WL 3267247, at *7-8 (D. Or. June 7, 2016) (holding
that a theater event cancelled due to wildfire smoke was covered because “the
infiltration of smoke into the interior of the theater is a covered ‘physical loss of or
damage to property’”).
74
See Gregory Packaging, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., No. 2:12cv-04418, 2014 WL 6675934, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2014) (finding that a business
interruption caused by “ammonia discharge inflicted ‘direct physical loss of or
damage to’ . . . facility . . . because the ammonia physically rendered the facility
unusable for a period of time.”).
75
See Matzner v. Seaco Ins. Co., No. 96-0498-B, 1998 WL 566658, at *3
(Mass. Super. Aug. 12, 1998) (deciding that loss of use of an apartment due to
buildup of carbon monoxide in the building was covered because “the phrase ‘direct
physical loss or damage’ is ambiguous [and can include more than] tangible damage
to the structure of insured property.”).
76
See Western Fire Ins. Co. v. First Presbyterian Church, 437 P.2d 52, 55 (Colo.
1968) (deciding that loss of use of church due to dangerous buildup of gas beneath
church that rendered it uninhabitable constituted “direct physical loss”).
77
See Hughes v. Potomac Ins. Co. of D.C., 199 Cal. App. 2d 239, 249 (Cal.
App. 1962) (finding that a house that had not been physically damaged by a landslide
was covered because it was unsafe to use as a result of the loss of lateral support
soil).
78
See Essex Ins. Co. v. BloomSouth Flooring Corp., 562 F.3d 399, 406 (1st Cir.
2009) (“we are persuaded both that odor can constitute physical injury to property .
. . [and] that an unwanted odor permeated the building and resulted in a loss of use
of the building . . . .”); Mellin v. N. Sec. Ins. Co., Inc., 115 A.3d 799, 805
(N.H. 2015) (finding that the loss of use of a condo due to cat urine odor coming
from a neighboring property was covered because “physical loss may include not
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Courts have also held that government orders to evacuate
properties due to a potential threat, such as a hurricane,79 building
collapse,80 or a riot,81 can trigger business interruption coverage.
Similarly, courts have held the inability to access insured property can
trigger business interruption coverage even though the insured
property itself did not suffer any tangible, physical damage.82 Finally,
one court has held that “physical damage” occurred when a soft drink
product had an off-taste and thus was unsalable even though the
product was safe to drink.83
only tangible changes to the insured property, but also changes that are perceived by
the sense of smell and that exist in the absence of structural damage.”); Farmers Ins.
Co. of Oregon v. Trutanich, 858 P.2d 1332, 1336 (Or. 1993) (finding that the cost to
remove an odor in a house from a meth lab constituted “a direct physical loss.”).
79
See Assurance Co. of Am. v. BBB Serv. Co., 593 S.E.2d 7, 9 (Ga. App. 2003)
(holding Wendy’s restaurants could recover business interruption coverage when
ordered to shut down and evacuate due to Hurricane Floyd even though the hurricane
did not ultimately cause tangible physical damage to the restaurants); Houston Cas.
Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. H-05-1804, 2006 WL 7348102, at *6 (S.D.
Tex. June 15, 2006), (holding business interruption due to government-ordered
evacuation in anticipation of Hurricane Floyd was covered even though insured
property did not suffer a tangible physical injury), report and recommendation
adopted sub nom. No. H-05-1804, 2006 WL 8446160 (S.D. Tex. July 11, 2006).
80
See Hampton Foods, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 787 F.2d 349, 352 (8th
Cir. 1986) (deciding that business interruption loss due to government-ordered
evacuation of a building due to the risk of collapse was a covered business
interruption loss if the policyholder could prove its lost profits even though none of
the policyholder’s property had a tangible physical injury).
81
See Allen Park Theatre Co. v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 210 N.W.2d
402, 403 (Mich. App. 1973) (holding loss of use of theaters due to a government
shutdown order in response to riots was covered even though there was no tangible
physical damage to the theaters); Sloan v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 207 N.W.2d
434, 436-37 (Mich. App. 1973) (same); Southlanes Bowl, Inc. v. Lumbermen's Mut.
Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 569, 570 (Mich. App. 1973) (holding loss of use of bowling
alleys, restaurants, taverns, snack bars, cocktail lounges and motels due to a
government shutdown order in response to riots was covered even though there was
no tangible physical damage to the properties).
82
See Fountain Powerboat Indus., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 119 F. Supp. 2d
552, 557 (E.D.N.C. 2000) (“Loss sustained due to the inability to access
the [insured] facility and resulting from a hurricane is a covered event with no
physical damage to the property required.”).
83
See Pepsico, Inc. v. Winterthur Int'l Am. Ins. Co., 24 A.D.3d 743, 744 (N.Y.
App. 2005) (off-tasting product that could not be sold was a covered loss under all
risk policy even though the product was not physically injured).
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Thus, in the COVID-19 context, because the threat of serious
illness or death at the policyholders’ business premises was so high,
governments shuttered businesses. Following the reasoning of the
cases discussed above, the policyholders suffered “physical loss of or
damage to property” even if COVID-19 was not proven to be present
in their businesses. The risk of people getting sick and dying from
being in the policyholders’ business premises was so high that the
business premises were rendered uninhabitable and unusable. That is
enough to trigger coverage.
Third, policyholders reasonably expect coverage under
business interruption policies when their business operations are
interrupted due to catastrophic events beyond their control. Indeed,
that is the very reason businesses purchase business interruption
insurance. Imagine business owners’ surprise when they learned from
their insurers that, after paying premiums for business interruption
coverage year after year, their business interruption loss claims were
denied, and they likely would need to file for bankruptcy if the
government does not bail them out. Because policyholders typically
do not get to see the policy language before they buy business
interruption insurance, their expectations regarding the scope of
coverage is not based on the policy language itself.84 Instead, it is
based on the type of insurance being purchased (e.g., business
interruption insurance) and the nature of their businesses. People buy
business interruption insurance to cover their lost revenues when their
business operations are interrupted for reasons beyond their control.
Consequently, when their businesses were ordered to shut down due
to COVID-19, the business owners reasonably expected their business
interruption insurance would cover the losses.
Fourth, the presence of the virus exclusion in some policies is
proof that policies that do not contain the exclusion cover COVID-19
losses. If all risk policies did not cover business interruption losses
caused by viruses because viruses cannot cause “physical loss or
damage to property,” then the virus exclusion would be unnecessary.
There is no need to exclude losses caused by perils which are not
covered under the insuring agreement language of a policy in this first
instance. Thus, the rule of policy interpretation which dictates that
policies should be construed as a whole, reconciling all the policy
84

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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provisions, dictates that business interruption losses caused by viruses
can constitute “physical loss of or damage.” Otherwise, the virus
exclusion would be unnecessary surplusage with no purpose.
Indeed, in other contexts, courts have reached the same
conclusion. For example, in United States Fire Insurance Co. v.
J.S.U.B, Inc.,85 the Supreme Court of Florida had to consider whether
construction defects could constitute covered occurrences under the
basic insuring agreement language in commercial general liability
policies. The policies at issue also contained “business risk”
exclusions that purported to exclude coverage for defective work done
by the policyholder. In finding construction defects could be covered
occurrences, the court reasoned that the presence of the business risk
exclusions in the policies proved construction defects could be
covered because the exclusions would be unnecessary surplusage
otherwise:
If . . . [construction defects] are never CGL
“occurrences” for purposes of the initial coverage
grant, then the business risk exclusions are entirely
unnecessary. . . . Why would the insurance industry
exclude damage to the insured’s own work or product
if the damage could never be considered to have arisen
from a covered occurrence in the first place?86
Thus, the very presence of the virus exclusion in some policies proves
that coverage for business interruption losses caused by viruses is
provided by policies that do not contain the exclusion.

85

979 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2007).
Id. at 886–87 (quoting Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673
N.W.2d 65, 78 (Wis. 2004)).
86
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THE POLLUTION AND VIRUS EXCLUSIONS DO NOT APPLY
1. Pollution Exclusion

The pollution exclusion does not apply to COVID-19 business
interruption losses because the exclusion is so broadly worded that it
could be interpreted to swallow almost all the coverage provided by
the policy. Consequently, because exclusions are considered
ambiguous if they can be interpreted in a way that swallows the basic
coverage provided by the policy, the pollution exclusion is not
applicable to COVID-19 claims.87 “Pollutant” is defined to include
“any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant . . . .”88
All materials are either a solid, liquid or gas. And, depending upon its
application, almost everything can be an irritant or contaminant. Thus,
if applied literally the way insurers advocate, then almost no coverage
is provided under property policies due to the presence of the pollution
exclusion. Such a result is not permitted under insurance law.
As one court has noted, the language in the pollution exclusion
is so broad that nearly everything that causes a loss could be excluded:
“the terms ‘irritant’ and ‘contaminant’ are virtually boundless, for
‘there is no substance or chemical in existence that would not irritate
or damage some person or property.’”89 Further, as another court
stated, the literal application of the exclusion would lead to absurd
results:
Applying these definitions in a “purely literal
interpretation . . . surely stretch[es] the intended
meaning of the policy exclusion,” and could lead to
absurd results “contrary to any reasonable
policyholder's expectations.” For example, “[t]aken at
face value, the policy's definition of a pollutant is broad
enough that it could be read to include items such as
soap, shampoo, rubbing alcohol, and bleach insofar as

87

See cases cited supra note 34.
Business Owners Policy, supra note 21, at 94.
89
Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Jabar, 188 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Pipefitters
Welfare Educational Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043 (7th
Cir.1992)).
88
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these items are capable of reasonably being classified
as contaminants or irritants.”90
Consequently, because the coverage provided by the policy cannot be
illusory,91 the exclusion must be ambiguous and, thus, it should be
interpreted narrowly in favor of the policyholder.
Numerous courts have reached the same conclusion when
interpreting similarly worded pollution exclusions.92 In doing so,
many of them also have noted that the pollution exclusion was
intended to apply only to environmental contamination caused by
industrial waste disposal activities, so they declined to apply the
exclusion in other contexts.93
90

Mellin v. N. Sec. Ins. Co., Inc., 115 A.3d 799, 806 (N.H. 2015) (quoting
Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Jabar, 188 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1999), and Century Sur. Co. v.
Casino W., Inc., 329 P.3d 614, 617 (Nev. 2014)).
91
See cases cited supra note 34.
92
See, e.g., MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1216 (Cal. 2003)
(“[Because the insurer’s] broad interpretation of the pollution exclusion leads to
absurd results and ignores the familiar connotations of the words used in the
exclusion, we do not believe it is the interpretation that the ordinary layperson
would adopt.”); Keggi v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 13 P.3d 785, 790 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2000) (concluding pollution exclusion was at best ambiguous regarding
whether bacteria was a “contaminant” under pollution exclusion). See also Westport
Ins. Corp. v. VN Hotel Grp., LLC, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1344 (M.D. Fla.
2010) (“Legionella bacteria are not ‘pollutants,’ and the Pollution Exclusion is
inapplicable.”), aff'd, 513 F. App'x 927 (11th Cir. 2013); Johnson v. Clarendon Nat.
Ins. Co., No. G039659, 2009 WL 252619, at *13 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2009)
(discussing that mold is not a “pollutant” under pollution exclusion).
93
See, e.g., MacKinnon, 73 P. 3d at 1216 (quoting Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v.
RSJ, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (“The drafters' utilization of
environmental law terms of art (‘discharge,’ ‘dispersal,’ … ‘release,’ or ‘escape’ of
pollutants) reflects the exclusion's historical objective—avoidance of liability for
environmental catastrophes related to intentional industrial pollution.”); Stoney Run
Co. v. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting
that the pollution exclusion did not apply to carbon monoxide in a building that
killed some occupants because the exclusion was only intended to apply to industrial
environmental pollution); Island Assoc., Inc. v. ERIC Group, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 200,
203 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (“[A]n insurer that wishes to exclude ‘everyday activities gone
slightly awry’ from coverage cannot rely on a broad reading of a pollution exclusion
clause.”); Thompson v. Temple, 580 So.2d 1133, 1134 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1991) (“Pollution exclusion clauses are intended to exclude coverage for active
industrial polluters, when businesses knowingly emitted pollutants over extended
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2. Virus Exclusion
For some COVID-19 business interruption losses, the virus
exclusion does not apply because the policies at issue simply do not
contain the exclusion. For claims under policies that do contain a virus
exclusion, policyholders may argue the exclusion should not apply
because insurers obtained regulatory approval of the exclusion by
misrepresenting the coverage provided under existing all risk property
policies in the absence of the exclusion. Specifically, when seeking
regulatory approval of the exclusion, ISO represented that “[a]lthough
building and personal property arguably could become contaminated
(often temporarily) by . . . viruses and bacteria, . . . property policies
have not been a source of recovery for losses involving contamination
by disease-causing agents . . . .”94
Policyholders may argue ISO’s statement in this regard is not
accurate. By 2006 when the virus exclusion was introduced, numerous
courts across the country had held that losses involving contamination
by “disease-causing agents” could constitute covered physical loss or
damage if the contamination “eliminated or destroyed” the function of
the property or rendered the property “useless or uninhabitable.”95 If
courts were to determine that regulatory approval of the virus
exclusion was obtained based upon a misrepresentation by the
insurance industry that property policies had not been a source of
periods of time.”). See also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 44, at 1699–1703
(discussing cases where courts refused to apply the pollution exclusion to claims that
were not traditional environmental claims).
94
ISO Circular, supra note 26, at 6.
95
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hardinger, 131 F. App'x 823, 826–27 (3d Cir.
2005) (noting that the presence of e-coli in a well could constitute physical loss if it
rendered the home useless or uninhabitable); Cooper v. Travelers Indem. Co. of
Illinois, No. C-01-2400-VRW, 2002 WL 32775680, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2002)
(“[T]he closure of the tavern on February 17, 1999 [due to e-coli contamination of
well] was a necessary suspension of [policyholder’s] operation of the tavern that
resulted from direct physical damage to the property at the insured premises.”); Port
Auth. of New York & New Jersey v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 236 (3d
Cir. 2002) (“[T]he policies cover ‘physical loss,’ as well as damage. When the
presence of large quantities of asbestos in the air of a building is such as to make the
structure uninhabitable and unusable, then there has been a distinct loss to its
owner.”); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Maples, 309 F.3d 1068, 1071 (8th Cir. 2002)
(noting that an uninhabitable house that had to be demolished due to presence of
mold could be a covered loss).
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recovery for claims based upon “disease-causing agents” that rendered
a property unusable, then the exclusion could be voided.96
Courts declining to enforce an exclusion based upon insurers’
misrepresentations during the regulatory approval process regarding
an exclusion’s impact on the existing coverage provided by policy
forms has some precedent. For example, during the extensive
litigation regarding the meaning of the “sudden and accidental” or
“qualified” pollution exclusion, the supreme courts in several states
refused to enforce the exclusion because they concluded the insurance
industry had made misrepresentations during the regulatory approval
process for the exclusion.97 Specifically, the courts found that insurers
misrepresented the intended impact the exclusion would have on
coverage for pollution claims under commercial general liability
policies.98 If a similar conclusion were reached regarding the virus
exclusion, then some courts might refuse to enforce the exclusion.
D.

PANDEMIC LOSSES ARE NOT UNINSURABLE

The insurance industry’s contention that “pandemic outbreaks
are uninsured because they are uninsurable” is belied by the fact some
insurers currently sell policies that specifically cover pandemic
losses.99 For example, the organizers of the Wimbledon tennis
championship reportedly have been paying almost $2 million a year
96
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (“If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a
material misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is justified in
relying, the contract is voidable by the recipient.”).
97
See, e.g., Sunbeam Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 781 A.2d 1189, 1192–93
(Pa. 2001) (“Thus, having represented to the insurance department, a regulatory
agency, that the new language in the 1970 policies—‘sudden and accidental’—did
not involve a significant decrease in coverage from the prior language, the insurance
industry will not be heard to assert the opposite position when claims are made by
the insured policyholders.”); Morton Int’l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am.,
629 A.2d 831, 875 (N.J. 1993) (applying regulatory estoppel to prevent the insurers
from taking a position regarding the meaning of “sudden and accidental” that was
inconsistent with their representations to state insurance commissioners); Joy
Techs., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493, 500 (W. Va. 1992) (applying
same regulatory estoppel).
98
See cases cited supra note 97.
99
See Am. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n, supra note 6.
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for insurance to cover the cancellation of the tennis event due to a
pandemic since the SARS outbreak in 2003.100 Wimbledon reportedly
will receive a $141 million insurance payout due to the cancellation of
the event this year as a result of COVID-19.101 The British Open golf
tournament was also cancelled due to COVID-19, and it similarly is
covered by insurance.102
In addition, since 2018, Marsh & McLennan has been selling
pandemic insurance that it calls PathogenRX.103 In marketing the
product, Marsh & McLennan’s website states:
Over the last few decades, diseases such as Zika,
MERS, SARS, and now COVID-19 have had dramatic
financial implications for myriad industries. . . .
....
To meet the growing concerns and risks surrounding
outbreaks, epidemics, and pandemics, in 2018 Marsh
partnered with Munich Re and Metabiota to create
PathogenRX,
an
integrated
pandemic
risk
quantification and insurance solution that provides
financial protection to businesses and their global
operations. Using straightforward triggers such as
mortality or infections in a defined area, the policy
provides indemnity protection that can make an insured
whole in the event of a demonstrable loss.104
Similarly, beginning in 2014, NAS Insurance Services Inc., in
conjunction with Ark Specialty Program of Lloyd’s of London, began
selling business interruption insurance for government-ordered
100

Wimbledon Shows How Pandemic Insurance Could Become Vital for Sports,
Other
Events,
INS.
J.
(April
13,
2020),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2020/04/13/564598.htm.
101
Id.
102
See, e.g., Cindy Boren & Matt Bonesteel, British Open Canceled For The
First Time Since World War II, Wash. Post (April 6, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2020/04/06/british-open-canceled-firsttime-since-world-war-ii/.
103
See PathogenRX: An Innovative Solution for Pandemic and Epidemic
Risks, MARSH, https://www.marsh.com/us/campaigns/pathogenrx.html (last visited
June 17, 2020).
104
Id.
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shutdowns due the Ebola virus.105 Thus, the proposition that insurers
do not and cannot insure pandemic losses because such losses are
uninsurable is refuted by the fact some insurers are selling insurance
specifically intended to cover pandemic losses.
E.

PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES COVID-19
INTERRUPTION LOSSES SHOULD BE COVERED

BUSINESS

There are also several public policies that support a finding of
coverage for COVID-19 business interruption losses. First, insurance
serves a quasi-public function as a social safety net by transferring
risks from individuals to a larger group or community.106 In the
absence of insurance, most people and their businesses would be
financially devastated if they: (1) were the victim of a catastrophe, (2)
became unemployed for a lengthy period of time, or (3) were stricken
with cancer or some other life-threatening disease. Public policy
supports the transfer of such risks from the individual to a larger group.
If there is no actual transfer of the risk of business interruption losses
from individuals to insurers, however, then that public policy would
be frustrated.
Second, compensating injured parties is another overriding
societal concern. Public policy strongly favors compensating injured
parties through insurance payments.107 Indeed, the public policy
105
See Stephanie Goldberg, NAS Offers Coverage for Ebola-Related Business
Closures, BUS. INS. (Oct.
17,
2014 12:00
AM), https://www.businessinsurance.com/Essay/20141017/NEWS06/141019880/
NAS-offers-coverage-for-Ebola-related-business-closures#.
106
See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 49, at 668; Christopher C. French, The Role
of the Profit Imperative in Risk Management, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1081, 1092–93
(2015); Stempel, supra note 49, at 1497.
107
See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 826 F. Supp. 155, 163–
64 (E.D. Va. 1993) (discussing that the public policy of compensating innocent
victims outweighed public policy of not permitting coverage for intentional action);
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Asbury, 720 P.2d 540, 542 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986)
(noting that the public policy favors compensating injured persons); Hudson v. State
Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1168, 1170–71 (Del. 1990) (refusing to void coverage
for intentional wrongdoing under an automobile policy because of the competing
public policy behind the state motor vehicle financial responsibility law); Grinnell
Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Jungling, 654 N.W.2d 530, 539, 541 (Iowa 2002)
(“Compensating [the policyholder’s] innocent victims . . . outweighs the concern
that [the policyholder] will unjustly benefit from coverage.”).
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favoring the compensation of injured parties is the primary reason
automobile insurance is mandatory.108 If the businesses injured by
COVID-19 will not be compensated for their losses by business
interruption insurance, then the public policy of compensating injured
parties through insurance would be frustrated.
Third, public policy favors the enforcement of legal
commitments. Insurers should honor their commitments to their
policyholders when they accept premiums year after year in exchange
for paying losses if and when they occur. As one court has stated,
“[o]ne [public] policy is that an insurance company which accepts a
premium for covering all liability for damages should honor its
obligation.”109 That means insurers, not policyholders, should bear the
financial burden of losses when losses occur.
Fourth, public policy favors preventing damages and injuries
from occurring. Indeed, the prevention and deterrence of injurious
conduct are some of the principal public policies that underly the
criminal justice and tort systems. 110 Injuries should be prevented if
possible. That, in fact, is the very reason governors issued lock-down
orders related to COVID-19—the prevention of unnecessary deaths of
people due to a rapid and overwhelming spread of the virus if social
distancing were not imposed. For similar reasons, numerous courts
108

See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 32, at 924–25 (stating that the
obvious purpose of mandatory auto insurance is to provide victims of automobile
accidents with access to funds to cover their losses); ABRAHAM &
SCHWARCZ, supra note 50, at 656–57, 706 (discussing state legislatures’ and courts’
refusal to enforce “intentional act” exclusions, “family” exclusions, and “physical
contact” requirements in auto policies due to the public policy favoring the
compensation of auto accident victims).
109
Creech v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 516 So.2d 1168, 1174 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
110
See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 14 (2d ed. 2019) (“Courts and writers almost always recognize that
another aim of tort law is to deter certain kinds of conduct by imposing liability when
that conduct causes harm.”); Travelers Indem. Co. v. PCR, Inc., 889 So.2d 779, 795
(Fla. 2004) ("[A]n equally basic aim of imposing liability for compensatory damages
resulting from negligent conduct is to deter such conduct . . . ."); Villaman v. Schee,
Nos. 92-15490, 92-15562, 1994 WL 6661, at *4 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 1994) ("tort law
is designed in part to deter negligent conduct . . . ."); Valerie Wright, Deterrence in
Criminal Justice: Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, 1 (Nov. 2010) (“[T]he criminal justice system as a whole
provides
some
deterrent
effect .
.
.
.”), https://web.archive.org/web/20171130140441/http://sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Deterrence-in-Criminal-Justice.pdf.
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have held the costs incurred to prevent damage are covered under
property policies in some situations.111 If policies did not cover the
costs associated with preventing imminent injuries, then policyholders
would be incentivized to simply wait for the injuries to occur rather
than prevent them from occurring in the first place. Public policy
favors pro-action to prevent injuries, not a reaction after injuries occur.
Insurers themselves recognize the wisdom of preventing
damage and injuries before they occur. Consequently, property
policies contain “sue and labor” clauses pursuant to which insurers
agree to pay the costs policyholders incur to minimize a loss once the
loss begins to occur.112 In the business interruption context, this goal
is advanced through “extra expense” coverage, which serves the same
purpose as “sue and labor” clauses by reimbursing the policyholder
for the costs it incurs while attempting to minimize the business
interruption loss and to return the business to full operations as soon
as possible.113
Thus, in the context of COVID-19 business interruption losses,
it should not matter whether a policyholder’s business was shut down
because it was demonstrably contaminated with the virus. As a matter
of public policy, business interruption losses caused by prophylactic
government orders to shut down operations also should be covered.
111

See, e.g., Assurance Co. of Am. v. Wall & Assocs. LLC of Olympia, 379
F.3d 557, 559, 563 (9th Cir. 2004) (property policy that covered “direct physical loss
involving collapse” was construed to provide “coverage not only for actual collapse
but also for imminent collapse . . . .”); 401 Fourth St., Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Grp., 879
A.2d 166, 168, 174 (Pa. 2005) (property policy that covered “direct physical loss
involving collapse” was construed to include coverage for “imminent falling down
of a building or part thereof.”); Doheny W. Homeowners' Ass'n v. Am. Guarantee
& Liab. Ins. Co., 70 Cal. Rptr.2d 260, 261, 264–65 (property policy that covered
“direct physical loss involving collapse” was construed to cover “imminent or actual
collapse” in order to avoid “the absurdity of requiring an insured to wait for a
seriously damaged building to fall . . . .”).
112
See, e.g., OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 44, at 1546 (“It is now
generally recognized that the purpose of a sue and labor clause is to provide an
incentive for an insured to act to mitigate any loss or damage to the insured subject
matter.”); Albany Ins. Co. v. Anh Thi Kieu, 927 F.2d 882, 894 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Sue
and labor expenses are sums spent by the assured in an effort to mitigate damages
and loss.”); Armada Supply Inc. v. Wright, 858 F.2d 842, 853 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Sue
and labor expenses are those reasonable costs borne by the assured to mitigate the
loss and thus reduce the amount to be paid by the underwriter.”).
113
See Business Owners Policy, supra note 21, at 69–70.
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Otherwise, policyholders would be incentivized to stay open and wait
for their businesses to test positive for the virus before shutting down.
Such an approach would lead to more people getting sick and dying.
It also would lead to potential liabilities for the businesses that could
have prevented the spread of the disease by closing instead of staying
open while waiting for a positive COVID-19 test result in order to
recover under their business interruption policies.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Regardless of the actual wording of the policy language,
insurers will contend that the language unambiguously does not cover
COVID-19 business interruption losses—either because the losses are
not due to “physical loss of or damage” to property or because of the
presence of the virus and pollution exclusions. They also will contend
that pandemics are uninsurable losses that they never intended to cover
and for which they did not collect premiums. Ultimately, they will
assert that if they nonetheless are required to cover such claims, then
the entire property insurance industry will be bankrupted.
Policyholders, on the other hand, will contend COVID-19
business interruption losses unquestionably are covered if their
policies provide “contamination” coverage and do not contain a virus
exclusion. Moreover, COVID-19 business interruption losses are even
covered by policies that do not include “contamination” coverage.
This is because, under the rules of policy interpretation, the undefined
phrase “physical loss of or damage” has been, and should be,
construed to include coverage for business interruption losses caused
by unsafe property conditions or government-ordered shutdowns. As
such, policyholders do not need to prove there was tangible, physical
damage to property caused by COVID-19 in order to recover.
Further, policyholders will argue that no exclusions in the
policies apply. First, they will argue the pollution exclusion was
intended to apply only to environmental pollution claims and its
application in other contexts would allow the exclusion to swallow the
policy’s basic coverage. Then, they will argue the virus exclusion
should not be enforced because the insurance industry made
misrepresentations to regulators in order to get the exclusion
approved.
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Policyholders will also argue that public policy favors finding
coverage for COVID-19 losses in order to fulfill the purposes of
insurance. Insurance is intended to serve as a social safety net to cover
financially devastating losses and compensate injured parties.
Ultimately, whether COVID-19 business interruption losses
are covered by insurance will be dictated by the policy language at
issue and the applicable state law, which can vary considerably from
state to state. Consequently, which courts decide the cases could be
the most important factor in determining whether the insurance
industry or their customers will be bankrupted by COVID-19 if a
government bailout is not forthcoming.

